


Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

Dr.-Ing. Abdalkarim Awad
27.1.2016



Informatik 7
Rechnernetze und
Kommunikationssysteme




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
Ethical issues


- The goal of this exercise to learn about the weakness of WEP.
- It is not intended to be used as a tool to steal information damage systems.



Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)


- WEP Encryption uses RC4 stream cipher






Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)


- WEP decryption uses RC4 stream cipher





RC4

- a proprietary cipher owned by RSA DSI
- another Ron Rivest design, simple but effective
- variable key size, byte-oriented stream cipher
- widely used (web SSL/TLS, wireless WEP/WPA)
- key forms random permutation of all 8-bit values
- uses that permutation to scramble input info processed a byte at a time




RC4: Two Steps

■ RC4 Key Schedule (Initialization)

```
for i = 0 to 255 do
    S[i] = i;
    T[i] = K[i mod keylen];
j = 0
for i = 0 to 255 do
    j = (j + S[i] + T[i]) (mod 256);
    swap (S[i], S[j]);
```

■ RC4 Encryption


```
i = j = 0;
for each message byte  $M_i$ 
    i = (i + 1) (mod 256);
    j = (j + S[i]) (mod 256);
    swap(S[i], S[j]);
    t = (S[i] + S[j]) (mod 256);
     $C_i = M_i \text{ XOR } S[t];$ 
```



RC4 Key Schedule

- starts with an array S of numbers: 0..255
- use key to well and truly shuffle
- S forms **internal state** of the cipher

```
for i = 0 to 255 do
    S[i] = i;
    T[i] = K[i mod keylen];
j = 0
for i = 0 to 255 do
    j = (j + S[i] + T[i]) (mod 256);
    swap (S[i], S[j]);
```



RC4 Encryption

- encryption continues shuffling array values
- sum of shuffled pair selects "stream key" value from permutation
- XOR $S[t]$ with next byte of message to en/decrypt

```
i = j = 0;
```

```
for each message byte  $M_i$ 
```


```
    i = (i + 1) (mod 256);
```

```
    j = (j + S[i]) (mod 256);
```

```
    swap(S[i], S[j]);
```

```
    t = (S[i] + S[j]) (mod 256);
```


```
     $C_i = M_i \text{ XOR } S[t];$ 
```

WEP decryption step-by-step

Step 1: Build the keystream


- Extract the IV from the incoming frame
- Prepend the IV to the key
- Use RC4 to build the keystream



WEP decryption step-by-step


Step 2: Decrypt the plaintext and verify

- XOR the keystream with the ciphertext
- Verify the extracted message with the some known data in the packet




Initialization vector (IV)

- It's carried in plaintext in the "encrypted" message!
- It's only 24 bits!
- There are no restrictions on IV reuse!
- The IV forms a significant portion of the "seed" for the RC4 algorithm!




What we know about the packets



Can be either
IP or ARP

- With 802.11, you know the first eight bytes of a packet
- Many IP services have packets of fixed lengths
- Most WLAN IP addresses follow common conventions.
- Many IP behaviors have predictable responses
- The network part of IP address is known



Example

test8.cap [Wireshark 1.12.3 (v1.12.3-0-gbb3e9a0 from master-1.12)]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter: wlan.bssid==64:66:b3:12:58:84

Channel: Channel Offset:

No.	Time	Source
5367	100.642672	131.188.37.
5395	100.879669	Fe80::a125:
5442	101.052322	Cisco_d9:dc
5529	101.256162	Tp-LinkT_12
5530	101.258034	131.188.37.
5634	101.666700	131.188.37.
5683	101.871547	131.188.37.
6153	104.430674	Tp-LinkT_12

<Hardware address: Broadcast
<Hardware address (resolved)
<Hardware address: Tp-Link
<Hardware address (resolved)
<Hardware address: Cisco
<Hardware address (resolved)
Frame check sequence: 0xc
WEP parameters
Initialization vector:
Key Index: 0
WEP ICV: 0x4c905b08 (cc
Logical-Link Control
Address Resolution Protocol (request)

```
00 aa aa 03 00 00 08 06 00 01 08 00 06 04 00 01 ..... %.....  
10 00 25 b4 d9 dc 80 83 bc 25 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..%.. %.....  
20 83 bc 25 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..%.. %.....  
30 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
```

Time (116 bytes) Decrypted WEP data (54 bytes)

Frame (frame), 116 bytes Packets: 19848 · Displayed: 147 (0,7%) · Load time: 0:00.498 Profile: Default

22:32 15.01.2015



ARP packet


15442	101.052322	Cisco_d9:dc:80	Broadcast	ARP	116	who has 131.188
15529	101.256162	Tp-LinkT_12:58:84	Broadcast	802.11	140	Beacon frame, S
15530	101.258034	131.188.37.28	239.255.255.250	SSDP	231	M-SEARCH * HTTP
15634	101.666700	131.188.37.28	224.0.0.2	IGMPV2	116	Leave Group 224
15682	101.871517	131.188.37.28	224.0.0.252	LLMNR	177	standard query

```

<Hardware address: Cisco_d9:dc:80 (00:25:b4:d9:dc:80)>
<Hardware address (resolved): Cisco_d9:dc:80>
+ Frame check sequence: 0xcf014bc3 [correct]
- WEP parameters
  Initialization Vector: 0x778e26
  Key Index: 0
  WEP ICV: 0x4c905b08 (correct)
+ Logical-Link Control
+ Address Resolution Protocol (request)
0000 aa aa 03 00 00 00 08 06 00 01 08 00 06 04 00 01
0010 00 25 b4 d9 dc 80 83 bc 25 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
0020 83 bc 25 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  
```


IV

Some common data in all ARP packets



Cracking the password

- Brute Force method
- Get the IV from an ARP packet (data packet)
- Get the encrypted data from the Packet as hex
- Assume the password consists from small/capital letters in addition to numbers
- Concatenate a 40 bits (5 chars) key to have the complete Key.
- Key schedule, obtain the vector S based on the key
- Using the encrypted data and S, decode the encrypted message and compare the results in byte 0, 1, 2,3,and 4, with 0xaa, 0xaa, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00.
- If the results are true, then the password is cracked



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